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This paper considers lessons from the practice of fiscal federalism for guidance on new
approaches to development finance. Despite the fact that inter-regional redistribution in
a federation relies on a central government with strong fiscal powers, the form of that
redistribution can be used as a benchmark for international development assistance
financing. In a federation, finance for less-developed regions takes the form of
equalizing transfers to sub-national governments. The objective of these transfers is to
enable sub-national governments to provide comparable levels of public services at
comparable tax rates, called fiscal equity, leaving them discretion to implement
interpersonal redistribution schemes within their jurisdictions. This same principle of
assuming that national governments rather than donor nations are responsible for
vertical equity within their borders leads to the view that the ideal form of development
assistance is a system of equalizing inter-nation transfers intended to enhance fiscal
equity.
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1 Introduction
This paper draws on ideas from the fiscal federalism literature—where transfers from
better-off to less well-off regions are the norm—for guidance in the search for
innovative new approaches to development finance. While it may be fanciful—or
utopian—at present to regard the world as a whole as a federation, thinking of it in this
way is an interesting point of reference. A global equalization scheme mimicking the
way in which redistributive finance occurs in a federation would lead to a pattern of
official aid that differs considerably from what we observe in practice. Contemplating
such a scheme and the principles behind it helps us understand how far problems with
different proposals for development funding are the result of the fact that there is no
counterpart of a central government, and how far they are the inevitable outcome of the
cooperative interaction of political entities with different objectives and interests.
It is worth highlighting at the outset some similarities and differences between
decisionmaking and institutions in federations and those that might be feasible in a
global setting. We have in mind relatively decentralized federations in which sub-
national governments have independent fiscal responsibilities. OECD examples include
Australia, Canada, Spain, Switzerland and the USA, while Argentina, Brazil, India, and
Malaysia are examples from the developing world.
The similarities arise from the fact that, in both instances, the population is divided
among governing states that have more or less autonomous authority over their fiscal
affairs. Sub-national governments, like nation-states, raise revenues to provide goods,
services and transfers to their residents. Moreover, the decisions of individual sub-
national governments may be taken independently of those of others. This
decentralization of authority gives rise to a number of relevant consequences.
−   Differences in average incomes. Residents of different states will inevitably have
different average incomes, and the states themselves will also be endowed with
different amounts of natural wealth. As well, there will be different degrees of social
and economic development. The disparities among sub-nations within nations may
not be as great as those between nations. Nonetheless, qualitatively similar issues
arise with respect to the desire to address these inequities through redistributive
policies—the vertical equity issue.
−   Differences in fiscal capacity. Related to the previous point, the decentralization of
fiscal responsibility will inevitably lead to states differing in their abilities to raise
revenues and in their needs for public expenditures. This implies that different levels
of public services can be provided at given tax rates across states. In the absence of
corrective measures, this can compromise efficiency in the allocation of resources
across states by giving rise to fiscally induced relocation. As originally observed by
Buchanan (1950), it also precludes the equal treatment of equals—horizontal
equity—across the group of states as a whole.
−   Spillover benefits and costs. Some policy issues transcend state borders and can only
be addressed by coordinated policies. Thus, nationwide public goods (e.g., defence)
provide benefits indiscriminately to residents of different sub-national jurisdictions.
Spillover benefits or costs may occur from public goods and services that are
delivered at the sub-national level (transportation facilities, cross-border pollution).
And, goals of redistributive equity (income redistribution, poverty alleviation,2
equality of opportunity, social insurance) may be viewed as national goals,
analogous to national public goods. Decentralization can cause inefficiencies to the
extent that cross-border spillovers of these sorts occur.
−   Fiscal externalities. Related to the above, fiscal decisions taken by one government
have indirect consequences for other governments because of the interdependency
of markets for products and factors of production. Tax or expenditure changes in
one jurisdiction may influence the allocation of factors or products across
jurisdictions (fiscal competition). Alternatively, the burden of tax changes in one
jurisdiction may be partly borne by agents in other jurisdictions, either at the same
or a different level (tax exporting, vertical fiscal externalities). These fiscal
externalities give rise to inefficiencies in the allocation of resources both within and
across jurisdictions (Dahlby 1996).
Of course, offsetting these adverse consequences of decentralization are the benefits
(Oates 1999). Sub-national levels of government can design their government
programmes with the needs, preferences and values of local residents in mind.
Moreover, they might be able to deliver public services and target transfers to their
citizens more efficiently than a centralized government. The latter may be less informed
and less accountable to local citizens. An important dimension of the case for
decentralization is that it applies particularly to public services and targeted transfers
that are important instruments for addressing economic and social development goals
and redistributive equity more generally. Intergovernmental fiscal arrangements in
federations are in large part devoted to ensuring that sub-national governments have the
capacity, the incentives and the discretion for delivering these programmes in a way that
fosters equity and efficiency in the nation as a whole (Boadway 2001).
Parallel to these similarities, there are some critical differences between the situation
faced by a federation comprised of autonomous sub-national governments and the world
economy comprised of independent nation-states. For one, the degree of mobility across
state borders is typically much higher in federations than internationally. Citizens can
move freely across borders; a common currency and a common set of legal and property
rights institutions apply; and policies are better coordinated. While these differences in
mobility lead to greater efficiency in the allocation of resources in the internal economic
union, they also result in greater opportunities for inter-state externalities and spillovers,
and therefore the need for coordinated or harmonized policies.
Another important difference is that there is likely to be much more consensus within
federations than across nations for addressing the consequences of inequality of
resources, incomes and opportunities across states. The fact of common nationhood may
imply that, despite the possibly lower degree of inequality across sub-national
jurisdictions, the will to redistribute—the sense of national solidarity—may be higher
than exists between nation-states. And, the concern for horizontal equity may be more
of a policy issue across sub-national governments in a federation than across nations in
the world economy.
The most important difference is that a federation has a national government with
substantive powers to address the adverse consequences of decentralized
decisionmaking. These powers typically include some degree of influence or even
coercion over sub-national governments. An important dimension of decisionmaking in
a federation is the assignment of responsibilities between the national and sub-national3
governments. Ideally, this is done in a way that represents the most reasonable
compromise between achieving the benefits of decentralization while facilitating
national equity and efficiency objectives. This is typically fostered by an asymmetric
division of revenue-raising and expenditure responsibilities—a vertical fiscal gap—with
the national government retaining the lion’s share of revenue-raising, and transferring
revenues in excess of its own requirements to the sub-national governments. Federal
government presence in the most important tax fields along with its ability to design
appropriate transfers to sub-national governments provides it with the instruments for
addressing issues of redistributive equity, and avoiding to the greatest possible extent
the adverse consequences of fiscal externalities and differences in fiscal capacity.
Moreover, the fiscal dominance of the national government enables it to play an
influential role in harmonizing taxation and expenditure policies of the sub-national
governments to enhance the functioning of the federation.
The presence of a central government that attends to issues of nationwide interest and
has the coercive powers of taxation and spending distinguishes a federation from a
community of nations, whether that is the entire world or regional groupings like the
EU. Since these latter groups have no strong central government, the ability to raise
revenues and to address matters of inter-nation redistribution and efficiency are
considerably compromised. These tasks must necessarily be based on voluntary
agreement, perhaps facilitated by the delegation of administrative authority to a central
institution. Nonetheless, the manner in which federal governments raise revenues for the
purposes of development-type objectives might be instructive as a benchmark against
which to evaluate possible new revenue sources to finance worldwide development.
A natural starting point is to contemplate the case in which there is a national
government overseeing a fairly decentralized federal system consisting of several
autonomous sub-national governments with independent fiscal authority. Both the
accepted principles and the practice of fiscal federalism should be instructive in this
regard. Using this as a benchmark, we can then consider financing arrangements in the
more realistic situation in which a world government does not exist or does not have the
coercive financial authority required to achieve the benchmark outcome. As a step
towards that, we contemplate the hypothetical case of a federation without a central
government after having discussed fiscal arrangements in a representative federation.
2 Revenue-raising in a federal setting
In a federation, the national and sub-national levels of government typically share the
responsibilities for redistributive equity, poverty alleviation, and development. Many of
the nation’s public services, targeted transfers and development investments are
provided under the authority of sub-national governments. As well, the latter typically
apply redistributive tax-transfer systems alongside the national government, although
the degree varies from federation to federation. The national government assumes
overriding authority for ensuring that minimum standards of redistributive equity and
opportunities apply nationwide. Even where sub-national governments are responsible
for delivering important programmes for economic development, opportunity, and
poverty alleviation, the federal government ordinarily assumes a significant share of the
financial costs. In keeping with the project objectives, our concern is with the revenue4
sources used to fund these programmes rather than the design of the programmes
themselves.
We focus on an idealized federation, one that draws on best practices around the world.
In such a federation, expenditure responsibility will be more decentralized than revenue
decisions: there will be a vertical fiscal gap. The delivery of important public goods and
services—including those in the health, education and welfare areas that serve important
redistributive purposes—will be assigned to sub-national governments. The national
government’s dominance in raising revenue flows partly from the desire to maintain an
efficient and fair national tax system, and partly from a need to finance transfers to the
sub-national level. As discussed below, these transfers enable to federal government to
achieve horizontal balance in the federation. They also enable to federal government to
exert influence over sub-national programme design to insure that national objectives
are met. Both the assignment of taxes and the design of the intergovernmental transfer
system are relevant for our discussion of global revenue sources, and we consider them
in turn. Before doing so, it is worth highlighting the nature of economic objectives in a
federation and how responsibility for them is shared between levels of government.
In a unitary state, economic objectives can be conceptualized by a national ‘social
welfare function’ which encompasses efficiency and equity objectives. Equity can be
further disaggregated into vertical and horizontal equity dimensions in which
comparable persons are treated comparably by the public sector (horizontal equity), and
a common degree of redistribution (vertical equity) applies nationwide: all citizens have
equal weight regardless of where they reside. In a federation, equity becomes blurred
since persons are simultaneously citizens of two jurisdictions, national and sub-national.
Vertical equity becomes a shared objective with the two levels of government both
implementing policies that redistribute. The extent to which vertical equity is regarded
as a national or a sub-national concern depends upon the extent to which social
citizenship is viewed as being at the national versus the sub-national level, and that
varies from federation to federation. Generally, there is a compromise in which sub-
national standards of vertical equity interact with national ones. In these circumstances,
horizontal equity can be violated for two reasons. First, if sub-nations adopt differing
degrees of redistribution, there cannot be horizontal equity nationwide, and this can be
regarded as a tolerable cost of achieving the diversity that federalism brings. Second,
decentralization itself implies that different sub-nations will have different abilities to
deliver comparable average levels of public programmes at comparable tax rates. Even
if it is desirable that sub-nations have some responsibility for determining the extent of
redistribution among their own residents, it might still be desirable to ensure that they
have the opportunities to provide comparable services at tax rates that are comparable in
other sub-nations if they so wish. This objective of enabling all sub-nations to have the
potential to implement comparable programmes at comparable tax rates—potential
horizontal equity—is referred to below as fiscal equity. It is a main objective of
intergovernmental transfers.
2.1 Assignment of revenue-raising authority
The principles of assigning revenue-raising responsibility in federations have been
widely documented, and the practice has been informed by the principles (McLure
1983). Since the tax-transfer system serves both a redistributive and a revenue-raising
objective, issues of fairness, efficiency and administrative simplicity all have a bearing.5
At the same time, specific forms of taxation may be used as a device for correcting
inefficiencies in the allocation of resources that might arise because of externalities.
Taxes may also serve as user fees or earmarking devices where one wants to abide by
benefit taxation in limited areas or to create entitlements. It is generally agreed that the
national government assumes major responsibility for nationwide efficiency—
efficiency in the ‘internal economic union’—as well as sharing responsibility for
redistributive equity. Moreover, the assignment of taxes should take account of the
consequences of decentralization mentioned above: induced differences in per capita
incomes and in fiscal capacity, spillovers and fiscal externalities.
These principles suggest that the national government should be assigned taxbases that
are important for redistributive purposes, those that are mobile across sub-national
boundaries, those that are unevenly distributed across jurisdictions, and those that might
be difficult to administer at the sub-national level. By the same token, sub-national
governments might be given access to taxbases that are not critical for redistribution,
taxbases that are immobile, taxbases that do not induce large differences in fiscal
capacity, and taxbases that are relatively easy to administer. With respect to the use of
taxes as corrective devices or as sources of earmarked funds, their use depends on the
jurisdictional scope of the activity to which they are directed.
By these criteria, the national government might have prior access to direct taxes on
individuals, businesses and major natural resources. Sub-national governments might
rely on property taxes, payroll taxes and various forms of consumption tax. This
presumes that while businesses and capital might be highly mobile across sub-national
boundaries, labour is not likely to be as mobile. Indeed, in what follows, we shall
basically ignore issues associated with labour migration. Specific taxes used to price
externalities might be applied nationally if the externality is national in scope
(environmental externalities that cross sub-national borders) or at the sub-national level
for externalities that are more local in nature (local congestion or pollution). This is
necessary to ensure that the responsible level of government has an incentive to take
account of all of the externalities: if externalities are nationwide, sub-national
governments will have no incentive to respond to those that spill over into neighbouring
jurisdictions and will therefore tend to set the tax rate too low.
These considerations are not cut and dried. There may be conflicts among the criteria,
and in some instances there are mechanisms for resolving such conflicts. Natural
resources are both immobile and unevenly distributed among regions, and that leads to
conflicting arguments about assignment. If it is important for sub-national governments
to have control over the development and taxation of natural resources, the immobility
argument might hold sway. In this case, their unequal distribution will give rise to
differences in sub-national fiscal capacities that can be addressed by a system of
equalizing intergovernmental transfers. Consumption taxes (such as a value-added tax)
might be difficult to administer at the sub-national level. Some taxbases can readily be
used at both levels of government through harmonization agreements, so sub-national
governments can piggyback on personal taxes set by the national government. This
provides both levels with access to a broad-based revenue source, while at the same
time allowing the national government to dominate the choice of base and rate structure.
As well, many of the administrative problems of sub-national taxes can be resolved
through the use of a single revenue-collection agency that serves both levels of
government. The relevant point is that in a modern decentralized federation, it is
desirable that both levels of government have discretionary access to broad-based6
revenue sources. This can be accomplished in ways that do not compromise either the
optimal design of such taxes or the costs of administering them by suitable institutions
of tax harmonization and coordination.
While broad-based taxes are ideal for revenue-raising and have suitable equity and
efficiency properties, there are a number of narrow-based revenue sources that are used
with other objectives in mind. In some cases, the fact that they raise revenues is a bonus,
or a ‘double dividend’. It is worth considering these individually since in some cases
they are related to taxes that might be considered suitable as worldwide revenue
sources.
−   Trade taxes. Taxes on international trade are used in OECD countries as instruments
of industrial policy rather than for raising revenue, and are typically national
government policy instruments. On normative grounds, economists might regard the
case for them to be weak, at least in countries that have ready access to broader
sources of revenue. The motive for using trade taxes may be political, or it may be
strategic (to exploit terms of trade advantages). In either case, by protecting local
producers, they lead to worldwide production inefficiency, and one would not be
tempted to view them as a model for raising revenues at the world level. This is
particularly the case if trade taxes protect producers from imports of LDCs.
−   Specific excise taxes. Although the bulk of tax revenues in federations comes from
broad-based taxes, taxes on specific commodities are often used as well. Common
bases include tobacco, alcohol and petroleum products, luxury items, and some
services such as hotels and communications. Specific excises may be viewed as
efficient revenue sources to the extent that demands are inelastic, despite the fact
that this very inelasticity also renders them highly inequitable. In the case of
luxuries, they may serve redistributive objectives. They may be used for tax
exporting purposes. Sub-national governments often use them for revenue-raising
purposes in federations where tax powers are otherwise highly centralized. Perhaps
the most important motive is as devices for addressing externalities arising from the
consumption of particular goods, such as health, or policing costs due to tobacco
and alcohol consumption or congestion from petroleum products. To the extent that
this is a justifiable motive, they provide a free source of revenue as a side benefit to
the government that levies them, which typically includes sub-national
governments. It seems equally likely that the motive for these taxes is
paternalistic—to discourage persons from consuming the goods in question (hence,
the term ‘sin taxes’).
−   Environmental taxes and levies. Related to the externality argument is the more
general use of taxes as devices for coping with environmental pollution (Sandmo
2000). In fact, despite the economic arguments for using taxes for this purpose, the
extent of their use is limited. More often than not, regulatory remedies or subsidies
are used and the potential double dividend is not exploited. Although there may be
political economy reasons for this, there may also be serious monitoring and
administrative costs associated with environmental taxes.
−   Gambling. Revenues from gambling of various sorts can be important, especially for
sub-national governments. In fact, gambling revenues are effectively equivalent to
excises taxes, and as such are every bit as inequitable as taxes on tobacco and
alcohol. However, one feature of them worth noting is that their revenues are often7
at least partly earmarked for charitable purposes. This may make them a candidate
for development financing, despite their adverse distributive properties (Addison
and Chowdhury 2003). It seems likely that earmarked gambling revenues partly
displace revenues that would otherwise be summoned for redistributive purposes.
−   Capital transaction taxes. Sub-national governments often also impose taxes on
various types of transactions, such as land sales, financial transactions and charges
on financial intermediaries. These may be regarded as revenue sources that are
easily administered, or as taxes that can be exported to non-residents. Otherwise, the
economic case for them is not at all clear.
−   User fees. Lower-level governments are often encouraged to use user fees to help
finance public services. These can range for prices changed for local services (water,
electricity, garbage) to school fees and user charges for health services. Since user
charges are paid by those whom the services benefit, they have no potential as
sources of finance for redistributive purposes except to the extent that the prices
themselves are income-tested. The case for them as sub-national revenues sources is
sometimes based on the argument that redistribution should be a national
responsibility.
−   Seigniorage. National governments obtain small amounts of financing from changes
in the money supply. This can be a relatively costless source of revenue unless
inflationary finance is used. In that case, inflation will impose its own tax on the
economy.
While the revenue raised by these narrow taxes is relatively small, some of them can be
important for sub-national governments whose own revenue-raising capabilities are
limited. Indeed, it can be argued that in some federations, sub-national governments
tend to rely too heavily on narrow taxbases with the result that the efficiency of the tax
system is compromised. Unless narrow taxes have their own efficiency advantages, it is
much fairer and more efficient to use broad-based taxes at both the national and sub-
national levels of government. Moreover, the simultaneous use of broad taxbases can be
achieved by agreements that retain a harmonized taxbase across the nation while at the
same time allowing both levels of government to have the discretion to set their own
rates.
There is a further complication in federations that is relevant for the case of world
development financing. In a decentralized federation, sub-national governments
typically engage in redistributive policies alongside those of the national government.
National redistributive policies can crowd out sub-national redistributive policies. This
is compounded by the fact that fiscal competition among sub-nations can induce a so-
called ‘race-for-the-bottom’ in redistributive policies. In order to attract businesses and
highly skilled persons, sub-national redistribution is competed down. This leads to an
important role for intergovernmental transfers to which we now turn.
2.2 Intergovernmental transfers
In a federation, resources are transferred from the better-off to the less well-off via both
the inter-personal tax-transfer system and intergovernmental transfers. The relative roles
ascribed to these two mechanisms reflect the redistributive responsibilities that the8
national government assumes. One can roughly think of the former as addressing
vertical equity objectives and the latter horizontal equity (or fiscal equity) objectives.
The reasoning is as follows.
Redistributive objectives are achieved by a number of instruments, including the income
tax-transfer system, social insurance, in-kind transfers to the needy, and the provision of
public services like health care and education. These diverse instruments reflect both the
multiple facets of redistribution policy and the usefulness of certain types of policies as
effective targeting devices. In federations, it is common for many of these policies to be
delivered by sub-national governments, which finance part of the costs from their own
sources. The national government typically retains sufficient influence over the
structure of the income tax-transfer system, even if it is co-occupied by sub-national
governments. But it also has an interest in influencing sub-national governments to
design their programmes so that national norms of redistributive equity are satisfied.
This is sometimes written into the nation’s constitution. The national government relies
on its system of intergovernmental transfers to pursue the national interest in a
decentralized federation. (The same transfers also aim at enhancing efficiency in the
internal economic union.) It is partly because of the need for transfers from the national
to the sub-national governments that a vertical fiscal gap is required.
Transfers take two broad forms. First, they may be used as an instrument for influencing
programme design of sub-national governments. Broad conditions can be attached
setting out minimum standards that programmes in areas like health, education and
welfare must satisfy to be eligible for the transfers. The extent of intrusiveness of such
conditions varies from nation to nation, and is a source of concern in many federations.
Conditional transfers are directed at vertical equity objectives, such as ensuring that
adequate levels of equality of opportunity and public services for the needy are being
provided at the sub-national level. Such conditionality has its parallel in development
financing, despite the absence of the analogue of a national government.
Second, and more relevant for our purposes, transfers fulfil an equalization role. When
the provision and partial financing of public services are decentralized to sub-national
governments, different sub-nations will have different abilities to provide common
levels of public services, resulting in horizontal inequities across the federation. The
argument is best illustrated, following Buchanan (1950), using a simple example as a
benchmark. Consider a federation in which sub-nations differ in per capita incomes.
Suppose sub-national governments levy a proportional income tax and use the proceeds
to provide equal per capita public services to all residents. (These are of the nature of
private services rather than public goods, along the lines of important public services
actually decentralized in federations.) If all sub-national governments levied the same
rate of tax, the level of public services provided per capita would differ systematically
with per capita sub-national incomes. Put differently, the net fiscal benefit (NFB)
received per person of a given income level in a given sub-nation—the difference
between the value of the public service provided and the tax payment—would differ
across sub-nations, and the difference would be the same for all income levels.
Nationwide horizontal equity would be violated. To correct for this horizontal inequity,
a system of equalization transfers could be instituted which effectively compensated
different sub-nations for differences in the amount of tax revenue they could raise by
applying the common tax rate to the incomes of their residents.9
With such an equalization system in place, the level of public services provided in each
sub-nation would be the same, and horizontal equity would be satisfied. In fact, the
outcome of the unitary state would be replicated. Interestingly, economic efficiency
would be served as well. The same NFB differentials that give rise to horizontal
inequity also provide a fiscal incentive for households and businesses to be misallocated
among sub-national jurisdictions (Buchanan 1952). This is a rare instance in economics
in which equity and efficiency arguments are mutually reinforcing.
This simple example is a caricature of reality, but it does serve to illustrate the main
point. Equalizing transfers enable different sub-national governments to provide
comparable levels of public services at comparable levels of taxation. In the real world,
things are more complicated than in the simple benchmark example, and these
complications affect the form of equalization transfers. Some of the complications are
as follows:
−   Sub-national budgets may have differing degrees of progressivity than assumed in
the benchmark case, where proportional taxes are used to finance equal per capita
benefits. If sub-national budgets are more progressive than that, a greater degree of
equalization will be needed to eliminate NFB differentials (and replicate the
financial features of the unitary state). By the same token, if they are less
progressive, less equalization is called for. In the limit, if the benefit principle is
applied at the sub-national level, no NFBs would arise and no equalization would be
called for on horizontal equity grounds.
−   There are other sources of NFB differentials besides differences in per capita
incomes. For one, public services may not be made available equally to all persons,
but may be targeted to certain groups in the society—school age children, the
elderly, the disabled, the ill, the needy, and so on. Different sub-nations with
different population mixes will have different needs for public expenditures if they
are to provide comparable levels of these kinds of services to their populations. For
another, sub-national governments may have access to source-based tax revenues
such as those on natural resources, and this may give rise to significant differences
in revenue-raising capacity. An equalization scheme should compensate for
differences in needs and in capacities to obtain revenues generated at source.
−   In the benchmark case it was presumed that all sub-national jurisdictions would
behave alike, so that with full equalization, the outcome of a unitary state would be
replicated. In fact, the essence of federalism is that different states have different
needs and preferences for public goods and services, and exercise their discretion in
very different ways. In these circumstances, there is a conflict between the desire to
achieve horizontal equity and the desire to have sub-national governments exercise
their own discretion. The compromise typically made is to arrange the equalization
system so that sub-nations have the potential to provide comparable levels of public
services at comparable levels of taxation without being compelled to conform.
Fiscal equity is fulfilled when this potential is achieved.
−   Some public expenditure takes the form of public goods rather than public services
that are private in nature. In this case, the appropriate amount of equalization for
horizontal or fiscal equity purposes becomes much more complicated, since there
are economies of scale in the consumption of public goods. In fact, it seems more
likely that the expenditure responsibilities decentralized to sub-national10
governments are dominated by those that take the form of public services of a
private nature.
Equalization according to these principles is employed in most federations (the major
exception being the USA), as well as in many unitary states with respect to local
governments. The nature of the schemes depends upon the extent of fiscal
decentralization. In cases where expenditures are much more decentralized than taxes,
equalization can be based largely on differences in need. Expenditure needs can be
measured as crudely as total population, or they can be based on estimates of the
standard costs of providing services of various sorts to particular segments of the
population. In federations with more decentralized revenue-raising, equalization can
also be based on the ability to raise revenues, and this can also take varying degrees of
sophistication. In some cases, the ability to raise revenues from a representative tax
system can be used. Alternatively, some more crude macro-based measure such as per
capita incomes might suffice. Moreover, equalization can be based on ‘gross’ as
opposed to ‘net’ systems. Net equalization refers to a purely redistributive system
whereby revenues to transfer to the sub-national governments with below-average fiscal
capacity come from levies imposed on those above the average. However, equalization
more often takes the gross form whereby the national government makes transfers to
some or all sub-national governments and finances them out of national general
revenues. In this case, the allocation of transfers is based on relative fiscal capacities
among sub-nations. The two cases differ mainly in the extent of vertical fiscal gap used
to finance the system.
In either case, the important point is that the financing of public services provided by
less well-off sub-national jurisdictions comes partly from transfers from better-off
jurisdictions. These public services are a very important element in the arsenal of
instruments used to address issues of redistributive equity and economic and social
development. They are arguably more important than the redistribution that takes place
as part of the national interpersonal tax-transfer system. The use of intergovernmental
transfers for horizontal or fiscal equity purposes is therefore of great importance from a
national equity point of view.
2.3 Cooperative behaviour by sub-national governments
Despite the reliance on the national government as an institution for fostering national
equity and efficiency objectives in a federation, it is useful to consider the possibility
that sub-national governments might also take initiatives voluntarily to achieve or to
thwart these same objectives. Here and in the next sub-section, we take up these
possibilities, with special emphasis on the revenue-raising function of sub-national
governments. In decentralized federations, sub-national governments can have
significant discretion in designing their programmes and in choosing their revenue
structures. While this discretion enables them to serve their local residents more
effectively, it also has the potential to induce inefficiencies and inequities in the national
economic union. Some of these inefficiencies and inequities could be ameliorated by the
harmonization of policies either undertaken voluntarily or negotiated collectively.
With respect to voluntary policy harmonization, the record is mixed. In the
decentralized federations of Canada and the USA, opportunities do exist for sub-
national governments to harmonize their broad-based revenue sources. Canada has a11
formal mechanism for harmonizing personal and corporate income taxes, and provinces
may choose to participate. The harmonization is limited to harmonizing taxbases and
allowing for a single tax collection agency: provinces are allowed full discretion over
tax rates. While most provinces participate in the personal income tax harmonization
agreements, the largest provinces accounting for three-quarters of taxable income do not
participate in the case of the corporate tax. On the other hand, for those that do not
participate, their tax systems do not deviate significantly from those of the participating
provinces. No doubt this is partly for historical reasons, since the current system
evolved from one in which the national government was the sole income tax user. The
record with respect to other taxes is more dismal. There is relatively little harmonization
of provincial sales taxes with the national sales tax system, despite the possibility
offered to them. And, for taxes that are mainly in provincial jurisdiction (resources
taxes, property taxes), there is virtually no harmonization, much to the detriment of
national efficiency. In the USA, there is even less harmonization, either of income taxes
or state sales taxes. This may reflect in part the much larger number of US states than
Canadian provinces. With respect to public services and transfers delivered by the
provinces and states, there is again no voluntary harmonization (apart from that induced
by national conditional transfers). On the contrary, there is some evidence that such
programmes are used in a strategic way, such as to attract only the most desirable
households to the jurisdiction.
Negotiated intergovernmental agreements that exist tend to involve both the national
and sub-national governments. As well, they are somewhat difficult to negotiate and
turn out to be ineffective. A prime example of this is the Agreement on Internal Trade in
Canada, whose purpose and features are much like trade liberalization agreements
among groups of nations (NAFTA, EU, WTO). While the articles of the agreement are
potentially far-reaching, in practice the agreement is ineffective because it relies on
voluntary compliance for enforcement. This is a consequence of the need to have
unanimous agreement and of the fact that the fallback position is for the national
government to assume responsibility for efficiency in the internal economic union.
There are many examples of bilateral agreements between the national government and
individual sub-national governments. But virtually all such agreements concern the
interest of the residents of the sub-national government involved. There are almost no
agreements involving inter-jurisdictional redistribution.
This mixed record of the effectiveness of intergovernmental agreements is again a
reflection of the primary role that a national government plays in a federation. This
tempers the lessons that can be learned for situations in which there is no effective
central authority to mediate, influence and coerce state behaviour.
2.4 Free-riding by sub-national governments
Not only might it be difficult to rely on sub-national government to behave
harmoniously, their behaviour might be overtly non-cooperative. This possibility exists
because, as mentioned, a sub-national government’s policies can have an impact on
residents or government budgets in other jurisdictions. We have mentioned fiscal
competition that arises between sub-national governments as a result of these fiscal
externality effects. However, there can also be forms of vertical interaction between
sub-national and national governments—so-called vertical fiscal externalities—that can12
be detrimental to national efficiency and equity. These can take various forms (Keen
1998).
First, the fact that the two levels of government are taxing the same agents implies that
policy changes at one level affect the budget at another. For example, if a sub-national
government increases its income tax rate, and if income is variable, the induced
reduction in the base will also reduce national tax revenues. Technically speaking, the
marginal social cost of revenues will be perceived by the sub-national government to be
too low. It can effectively spread part of the burden of raising its revenues to other
jurisdictions.
Second, national government redistibution can crowd out redistribution at the sub-
national level. Potentially sub-national governments can exploit this by limiting their
own redistribution on the expectation that the national government will compensate.
Third, interdependence will arise if taxes paid at one level of government are deductible
from taxable income at another level. A sub-national tax that is progressive could
become regressive if it can be deducted before levying a progressive federal tax.
Finally, sub-national governments can sometimes manipulate the amount of transfers
they receive from the national government through their fiscal policies. In the extreme
case, they can exploit any soft budget constraint that might apply between the national
and sub-national governments. The existence of these opportunities depends on the
design of the transfer system and on the ability of the national government to commit
itself to a given level of transfers regardless of the fiscal choices taken by sub-national
governments.
2.5 Summary
In a well-functioning federation, sub-national governments are assigned responsibility
not only for local public goods but also for policies that are crucial to the efficient and
equitable functioning of the national economic union. These include important public
services like health, education and social services, as well as some targeted transfers.
Although this decentralization is motivated by concerns with efficiency and catering to
local preferences and needs, the national government has a clear interest in the standards
with which sub-national programmes might conform. To ensure that national norms of
efficiency, equity and development are addressed, the national government typically
retains a dominant position in the interpersonal tax-transfer system, which is one
instrument for vertical equity. It also makes substantial transfers to sub-national
governments to equalize the capacity of sub-nations to provide comparable levels of
public services at comparable levels of tax rates, and to ensure that they have the
incentive to provide programmes in conformity with the national interest. This implies a
vertical fiscal gap, with the national government collecting more revenue than it needs
for its own purpose and transferring the remainder to the sub-national governments. The
latter are assigned sufficient revenue sources of their own, especially broad-based ones,
to ensure that they are accountable to their constituents for the programmes they deliver.
Ideally, their taxes are harmonized with those of the national government, and they are
fully responsible for raising marginal revenues for determining the sizes of their
budgets. The object of the national-sub-national fiscal arrangements is to obtain the13
benefits of decentralized decisionmaking while at the same time avoiding its costs. The
oversight role of the national government is critical to this objective.
3 A federation with no central government
In a federation, the national government plays a critical role in pursuit of redistributive
equity alongside sub-national governments that deliver important public services. The
balance between the two levels has shifted over the past several decades. Sub-national
governments have become more important as the role of public services like health,
education and social services as major redistributive devices has grown, and the virtues
of decentralization have been realised. In some federations (Canada), the national
government’s expenditures are predominantly transfers, while those of the provinces are
mainly on goods and services. This decentralization has put some stress on the ability of
the national government to impose its redistributive objectives.
In the limit, decentralization would result in a federation with a weak national
government. In this section, we pose the hypothetical question of how redistributive
goals might be achieved in the limiting case where there is no effective national
government. This serves as a useful benchmark against which to address similar issues
globally.
It is worth first pausing to reflect on the nature of redistributive objectives in a federal
setting, loose or otherwise. Redistribution is a key role of governments in any OECD
nation. A cursory look at government budgets will confirm that a high proportion of
spending is devoted to programmes with redistributive intent, not just those involving
income redistribution but also public goods and services. For example, public spending
on education, health and social services would be hard to justify on purely efficiency
grounds. While it might be possible to conceive of sizeable redistribution being the
consequence of a political process that reflects purely the self-interest of the voting
population, these considerations alone seem inadequate to account for the scale of
redistribution one actually observes. It seems more likely that there is some more
fundamental social consensus or solidarity underlying the phenomenon. Some observers
have equated this solidarity with a notion of social citizenship: one’s membership in a
nation entitles one not just to the legal and political rights that come with citizenship,
but also with social and economic rights (Purdy 2001). In other words, the political
community is also a sharing community, as if reflecting some social contract. These
rights of social citizenship may be written into the national constitution, or they may
simply reflect an ongoing social consensus. The extent of the social consensus will vary
from nation to nation, and will vary within nations from time to time as political
outcomes change.
In a federation, social citizenship is blurred by the fact that one is a citizen both of the
country as a whole and of a sub-nation. There are two simultaneous concepts of
solidarity, one nationwide and one sub-national. The balance between these two levels
of solidarity can be the source of considerable tension within federations: to what extent
should national solidarity trump sub-national solidarity? That is, to what extent should
redistribution be the role of the national as opposed to the sub-national governments?
The compromise will vary from federation to federation: national solidarity may be14
relatively more important in, say, Germany than in Belgium, where sub-national
solidarity in the linguistic communities is also important.
But even in highly decentralized federations, the relevance of social citizenship at the
national level remains strong. The Canadian case represents a good example of this,
given that it is one of the most decentralized federations in the world (although even
here sub-national solidarity in certain regions can be important). The provinces deliver
all the important public services and raise a substantial proportion of their own revenues
through broad-based taxes. A great deal of redistribution occurs at the sub-national level
of government. The national government also engages in redistribution, largely through
the tax-transfer system. But, much of its redistributive activity involves
intergovernmental transfers, and much of this is directed at achieving fiscal equity
among provinces. Social citizenship is thus a compromise: the national government
provides transfers to the provinces out of national general revenues to ensure that
provinces have the potential for providing reasonably comparable public services at
reasonably comparable levels of taxation. The provinces then choose their own fiscal
policies more or less unfettered by national constraint. Even in this highly decentralized
fiscal system, a high degree of consensus seems to exist for national social citizenship.
Nonetheless, that consensus is perceptibly weakening as the nation gradually becomes
more decentralized, although the direction of causation is unclear. Moreover, many of
the instruments used to achieve social citizenship are the legislative responsibility of the
provinces.
In contemplating a federation without a national government, two key differences with a
standard federation must then be recognized. The first is that government-to-
government transfers will be relevant for redistribution among regions since there is no
national government that can collect revenues nationwide to transfer to sub-national
governments or their citizens. Second, the issue must be faced as to the degree of social
consensus that exists for ensuring that citizens of different jurisdictions have
comparable capacities for providing public services and engaging in redistribution of all
forms. One presumes that national social citizenship becomes much weaker in this
context, and the extent of intergovernmental transfers that citizens might wish their sub-
national governments to engage in will be less than in a full-fledged federation with a
purposeful national government.
Let us presume that there is at least some degree of social consensus for redistribution
from citizens of better-off sub-nations to those of less well-off sub-nations. Moreover,
the principle of subsidiarity can be taken for granted: sub-national governments are
accepted as being those most capable of implementing redistributive policies within
their own jurisdictions. Thus, the relevant form of redistribution is sub-nation to sub-
nation. We consider some features that such redistribution might take, treating
separately the cases in which sub-national governments do and do not coordinate their
activities.
3.1 Non-cooperative sub-national redistribution
To the extent that a consensus exists for some degree of solidarity among all citizens in
the nation, individual sub-national governments in better-off regions acting on behalf of
their own citizens will want to make transfers to less well-off jurisdictions. The situation
is analogous to nations voluntarily contributing to an international public good: here the15
public good is the total amount of the transfer, from which all nations simultaneously
benefit. The economics literature has developed the characteristics of the outcomes that
might be expected in a setting in which several nations make independent (non-
cooperative) contributions to an international public good (Sandler 1992; Boadway and
Hayashi 1999). Although the models are simplistic and the assumptions strong, the
message of that literature is stark, even if it has only an element of truth. In fact, no
matter how far the degree of solidarity or social citizenship extends across sub-national
borders, the outcomes that are predicted when sub-national governments behave non-
cooperatively differ considerably from those that could be expected to occur if a
national government were overseeing interregional redistribution. The following
summarizes some of the relevant results.
−   The total level of transfers—the sum of the transfers of all better-off jurisdictions—
is less that the optimal level. There is a free-riding problem associated with each
nation’s contributions, implying that each sub-nation contributes less than it would
in a coordinated approach, such as with a national government.
−   Sub-nations that have the highest per capita incomes will contribute proportionately
more than they would in the coordinated setting, the phenomenon of
disproportionate burden sharing, and is a consequence of the Shibata-Warr
neutrality theorem whereby income redistributions among contributors are fully
offset by changes in contributions in equilibrium.1
−   Sub-nations with the highest populations will contribute disproportionately more
than those with lower populations. This reflects the fact that the higher proportion of
benefits of the contribution internalized, the larger the population. As a result,
persons in more populous donor nations will tend to be worse off, all else equal.
−   Increased contributions to the less well-off sub-nations from some outside source
will crowd out voluntary transfers. Indeed, if increased contributions were financed
by taxes imposed on the contributing sub-nations, the crowding-out would be full.
These predictions are somewhat surprising, but they are also cautionary. They point out
the inefficiency and inequity of a system of voluntary transfers—inefficiency because
the amount transferred is less than all contributing jurisdictions would agree to, and
inequity because the contributions in equilibrium may bear no close relation to a
jurisdiction’s well-being or ability to pay. The predictions also indicate that introducing
small increments of transfers into a world in which sub-nations are making voluntary
contributions can be effectively pointless. Thus, additional sources of revenues made
available by, say, a new global tax source could be largely crowded out by reduced
voluntary sub-national transfers. Equivalently, if the sub-nations collectively agreed to
provide additional financing for transfers, this additional contribution would crowd out
their voluntary transfers on a one-for-one basis, at least until the latter were fully
crowded out.
                                                
1 This theorem says that when a public good is financed by voluntary donations, the equilibrium level
of public good is independent of the distribution of income. Any redistribution of income among
contributors will be completely offset in equilibrium by equal and opposite changes in contributions.
Moreover, any incremental contribution by the government will crowd out private donations on a one-
for-one basis. See Shibata (1971) and Warr (1983).16
The literature also suggests that the free-rider effects of a voluntary contribution
equilibrium could be undone by a system of incentives. If subsidies are provided for
voluntary transfers—analogous to the tax incentives that are provided for individual
contributions to charity—efficiency could be restored. Such a scheme would require
either some national authority or coordinated action by the sub-national governments, as
well as some source of revenue to finance the subsidies. All of these are ruled out in the
non-cooperative case.
3.2 Cooperative sub-national redistribution
Given that non-cooperative sub-national outcomes are likely lead to inadequate levels of
interstate redistribution and inequitable distributions of burdens, it is natural to consider
the possibility of cooperative behaviour among sub-national governments. Cooperative
outcomes should be possible since all jurisdictions can potentially gain relative to the
non-cooperative case. Moreover, cooperative solutions should in principle lead to a
fully efficient outcome in the sense that, as in the case with standard public goods, the
sum of the marginal benefits to all donor sub-nations from redistribution equals the sum
of the marginal costs.
In contemplating such cooperative solutions, we immediately confront the problems that
arise in arranging the terms of the cooperative bargain when the gains from the bargain
must somehow be divided among the various sub-nations. A cooperative outcome must
achieve unanimous agreement, and this is notoriously difficult, especially where many
governments are party to the negotiations. This is particularly the case when all sub-
nations are involved, both net donors and net recipients of the transfers. As well, some
dispute settlement mechanism is required to ensure that all sub-national governments
abide by the agreement. In the absence of a central authority, this is difficult to achieve.
As mentioned above, the record of achieving unanimous agreement among sub-national
governments in a federal setting is not encouraging.
On the other hand, among nation-states progress has been made with respect to such
agreements, although success has been much more pronounced where pure efficiency
gains are at stake than those involving redistribution. The EU is a case in point, where
agreements exist in a variety of areas including agriculture, competition policy, science
and technology, regional policy, trade, and even social policy (Artis and Nixson 2001).
In some cases, agreement was a long time coming and many compromises were
involved. Moreover, sometimes the agreements were asymmetric in the sense that
different countries participated to differing extents. Perhaps this illustrates that with
enough persistence, agreements can be reached among nations even where redistributive
policies are involved.
We proceed by setting aside the difficulty of bargaining to obtain some insight into the
kinds of agreements that should be possible among sub-national governments acting in
the absence of a national government. In principle, these ought to be able to mimic what
a benevolent central government acting on the basis of a national consensus would
implement. Taking that as a reference point, we can imagine two sorts of institutional
mechanisms being negotiated among sub-national governments to finance redistribution
from better-off to less well-off sub-nations—taxes on the better-off states or taxes on
agents or their transactions. Since our focus is on the financing of development
assistance rather than its use, we concentrate on the source of funds.17
3.2.1Taxes on sub-national governments
Sub-national governments might agree to tax themselves, that is, to make equalization
transfers for the purpose of redistributing to the less well-off sub-nations. The question
then is how ought the transfers be distributed among the contributing sub-nations. The
answer depends upon a judgement as to what constitutes a fair allocation of the burdens
of the transfers. Following the above discussion of intergovernmental transfers in a
federation, the concept of fairness applied to sub-national jurisdictions is different from
that applied to individuals in the case of a personal tax system. This is because the sub-
nation consists of a distribution of households of different incomes. Presumably, in our
hypothetical federation without a national government, sub-national governments would
assume full responsibility for vertical equity within their borders. They may choose
differing degrees of progressivity because of difference sub-national consensuses about
the desirable amount of redistribution. Fiscal competition pressures may also affect their
policies of redistribution. In either case, there is little that a system of transfers from
jurisdictions can, or should, do to rectify this. To the extent that different jurisdictions
have different preferences for redistribution, there is no good reason to override those
differences. And, dealing with the adverse effects of fiscal competition for intra-
jurisdictional redistribution is something with which a system of intergovernmental
transfers cannot cope. Addressing that problem is, after all, one of the roles of a national
government in a federation.
Given this, a suitable basis for fairness in a federation with only sub-national
governments is fiscal equity. Full fiscal equity is equivalent to taking the normative
position that citizenship in the nation carries with it some obligation of equal treatment
nationwide, tempered only by the fact that sub-national governments should have the
discretion for designing programmes for vertical equity within their jurisdictions.
Equivalently, full fiscal equity involves ensuring that each sub-national government has
the potential to be able to provide comparable public programmes at comparable tax
rates to the residents of their respective jurisdictions.
In the context of a highly decentralized federation without a national government, the
rights of social citizenship in this full sense may not reflect a societal consensus.
Instead, the consensus might be that full fiscal equity is too extreme, and that some
partial notion of fiscal equity is acceptable. In this case, the objective of the transfer
system would still be to redress differences in the ability of sub-national governments to
provide programmes to their citizens at given tax rates, but now only partially, so fiscal
equity is imperfectly achieved. There is still no particular reason to override the
redistribution sub-national governments undertake in their own jurisdictions.
Whatever degree of fiscal equity is deemed appropriate, the base that is suitable for
determining the fair set of transfers is the same: only the rate of equalization applied to
that base needs to differ. We have discussed in broad terms the principles of
equalization in a federal setting. Those same design principles would apply here,
although the degree to which equalization is pursued might differ. If full fiscal equity
were the criterion—and this is a useful benchmark to use—transfers would equalize the
ability of all sub-national governments to provide comparable levels of public services
at comparable tax rates. The precise equalization formula would include elements
reflecting both revenue-raising capacity and expenditure needs, and would depend on
the policies implemented by the representative sub-national government, including both
their tax structures and their expenditure programmes. A conventional standard case that18
informs the revenue equalization system in some federations is as follows. Suppose sub-
national taxes are roughly proportional to income when taken as a whole. And suppose
that public services provided roughly equal per capita benefits to all households. Then
an ideal equalization system for full fiscal equity purposes would be designed as
follows:
i)  Representative taxbases would be constructed for all taxes used by sub-
national governments. From this would be calculated the per capita base for
each tax source in each sub-nation (bij for taxbase i in sub-nation j), and the
average per capita taxbase nationwide (Bi);
ii)  Nationwide average tax rates (ti) would be calculated as the ratio of total sub-
national tax revenue from the base to the nationwide size of the base;
iii)  The per capita equalization entitlement for a sub-nation j from a taxbase i
would be calculated as ti(Bi - bij);
iv)  The above calculation would be done for each sub-nation and each tax type. A
sub-nation’s total equalization entitlement would be the sum of all per capita
entitlements (positive and negative) from all tax sources multiplied by its
population: ∑I ti (Bi - bij)Nj;
v)  The sum of entitlements over all sub-nations would be zero. Those with
superior revenue-raising ability would be positive, and those with deficient
revenue-raising ability would be negative.
In the above calculation—referred to as the representative tax system approach—the use
of national average sub-national government tax rates ensures full revenue equalization.
This rough and ready approach to equalization would be appropriate if sub-national
fiscal structures roughly corresponded to those of the standard case.
Since spending programmes are targeted to particular groups in the population rather
than being of equal per capita benefit to all, equalization entitlements can be adjusted to
account for the fact that different sub-nations have different expenditure needs arising
from the fact that their differing population mixes. A representative expenditure needs
approach, analogous to the above, could be used. Differences among sub-nations in the
per capita cost of providing a given level of a particular type of public service would be
equalized. The procedure would be to estimate a national average cost of providing a
unit of service to a person of a given demographic group. This cost would be combined
with the number of persons of that group in each sub-nation to determine expenditure
need for that service. Deviations from the average would then be equalized.
If the consensus is for less than full fiscal equity (or if the sum total of transfers is set
exogenously), the above procedure could be revised accordingly. We can concentrate on
the implications of partial fiscal equity for donor sub-nations. The simplest procedure
would be to reduce each sub-nation’s assessed equalization entitlement proportionately
from the full equalization case. This would be equivalent to equalizing differences in
per capita taxbases by less than national average tax rates, in the case of revenue
equalization, and reducing the unit cost used for equalizing needs differences. Applying
this procedure to the donor sub-nations would imply that proportionately less than full19
fiscal equity was implemented not only between donor and recipient sub-nations, but
also among all donors.2
The above procedures, though not unlike what is done in various federations on either
the revenue or the expenditure-needs sides, appear to be complicated. Some observers
have argued for a simpler procedure, such as basing equalization on a single macro
measure, such as per capita sub-national income or consumption. This is the approach
used by the EU, whose budget is financed by a proportionate levy on member states’
GDP. Though this leads to a simpler calculation, it is conceptually problematic. Macro
indicators are unlikely to be an accurate reflection of either the revenue-raising capacity
of sub-national governments or their needs for expenditures. For example, they do not
take account of the fact that different taxbases (e.g., resources versus capital income
versus consumption) have different revenue-raising potential and typically are taxed at
very different rates. Those who propose macro formulas typically have objectives other
than simplicity in mind. Some treat inter-jurisdictional redistribution as being analogous
to interpersonal redistribution and view the base as comparable to the ability to pay of
the representative household (Barro 2002). However, as we have argued, there is a
fundamental difference between interpersonal redistribution and inter-jurisdictional
redistribution, the former being directed at vertical equity and the latter at horizontal
equity. Nonetheless, if sub-national tax structures are sufficiently different, the
representative tax system approach to equalization becomes difficult to implement, and
one may be forced back to a simple macro measure.
While agreement on the set of sub-national transfers is primarily a matter of fiscal
equity, sub-national agreement may go beyond that to include some provisions for
harmonizing vertical equity within sub-national governments. This could be a way of
dealing with the tendency for sub-national governments to compete down their
redistribution programmes. It might also reflect a national consensus for norms of
vertical equity or social citizenship, analogous to the harmonization of social protection
in the EU. However, the existence of harmonized systems of social protection does not
detract from the principles outlined above for the design of a system of equalization
transfers.
3.2.2Taxes on agents
An alternative means of raising revenues to transfer to less well-off regions is for sub-
national governments to agree to tax agents directly. This is natural to consider since it
has the potential to mimic what a national government would do. The manner in which
tax revenues might be raised cooperatively depends on the structure of the tax systems
employed by sub-national governments, as well as on the normative objectives of the
national tax, including especially whether there should be common standards of equity
applying nationwide (despite the absence of a national government). Some
considerations are as follows.
A key factor in contemplating a new national tax in an otherwise fully decentralized
system of sub-national governments is the perceived nature of nationwide equity. If the
view is taken that vertical equity is the responsibility of sub-national governments, the
                                                
2 Note that this procedure would leave the list of donor nations unchanged: all those with per capita
taxbases above the world average would be included. One could also adapt to a lower level of
transfers by removing less well-off middle-income countries from the list of donors.20
most that might be expected from a national tax is that some degree of fiscal equity is
achieved. Then, the ideal tax would be one that mimics the equalization scheme
outlined above. A single tax at a common rate on a broad base would not be perfect
since the revenues raised from each jurisdiction would not reflect its tax capacity or its
own expenditure needs. If a separate tax rate could be applied in each jurisdiction, any
pattern of sub-national incidence could be achieved, but one presumes that differential
tax rates across sub-nations would not be an easy thing to negotiate.
Nonetheless, a broad-based tax at uniform rates would be an approximation of a fiscally
equitable outcome. It would correspond with the macro approach to equalization.
Suitable taxbases might include consumption or income. Indeed, if the tax were a direct
one, it could be progressive. That would be appropriate if the vertical equity were the
responsibility of the national government.
Even if there is agreement for a broad taxbase, there would be problems with
administering the tax. In an ideal situation—such as exists in some federations—the
taxbase would be harmonized among sub-national governments. A national tax could be
piggybacked onto those levied by sub-national governments. There are different forms
this could take, depending on the taxbase used. In the case of personal income taxes, a
national surtax could be imposed on each agent’s sub-national income tax liabilities (in
which case sub-national progressivity is retained) or on sub-national taxbases. In the
case of sales taxation, if a multi-stage tax is used sub-nationally, the national surcharge
could be limited to the final stage. This would however require a significant degree of
harmonization among sub-national sales tax systems. In the absence of such
harmonization, piggybacking would be problematic since the amount of revenue raised
in each sub-national jurisdiction would vary arbitrarily with the definition of the
taxbase. If piggybacking is not feasible, the national tax would have to be collected on
its own, but with significant administrative costs.
Suppose, however, that a broad-based national tax is implemented. A further problem
concerns the crowding-out of sub-national government voluntary transfers. In the
hypothetical context we are imagining of a nation without a national government, it is
likely that better-off sub-national governments would make voluntary transfers to less
well-off ones as long as there were significant disparities in well-being among sub-
nations. The parallel is with voluntary intergovernmental transfers among nations in the
real world. In the case of sub-nations, the case for voluntary transfers would be stronger
because of the presumed solidarity among national citizens residing in different sub-
national jurisdictions. To the extent that voluntary inter-jurisdictional transfers were
undertaken—albeit inefficiently as discussed earlier—theoretical reasoning would
suggest that they would be crowded out, perhaps on a close to one-for-one basis (the
Shibata-Warr theorem). While that is not necessarily bad, given that the pattern of
voluntary transfers is likely to be unrelated to a reasonable national equitable criterion,
it does imply that more of a burden would be placed on raising revenues than would
otherwise be the case. One way out of this dilemma would be for sub-national
cooperation to include elements of both taxes on states and taxes on agents.
An alternative to a new national tax imposed on a broad base would be one imposed on
a narrower base. This might be attractive for three reasons. First, a narrow-based tax,
such as one on a readily identifiable class of transactions, might be easy to administer in
the absence of a national government. But, there are serious problems with a narrow-
based tax whose only attraction is ease of administration. To the extent that the demand21
for the taxed item were elastic, inefficiencies would result. On the other hand, for less
elastic bases, the tax would likely have adverse equity properties in the sense that their
incidence would fall disproportionately on lower income persons. Moreover, the
incidence of the tax by sub-national jurisdiction would bear no close relation to fiscal
equity.
Second, the inefficiencies of a narrow tax will be avoided to the extent that the
transaction involved emits adverse national externalities. (If the externalities are
localized, presumably they will be taken care of by sub-national tax systems.) In this
case, the revenues raised are seemingly costless from an economic point of view: the
double-dividend argument (Sandmo 2003). However, relying solely on double-dividend
taxation to raising revenues for less well-off jurisdictions is not without problems.
These tax revenues will have a strong tendency to crowd out voluntary transfers made
by sub-national jurisdictions or their residents. Also, the implicit incidence of these
revenues on donor sub-nations will not correspond with what might be considered fair
on fiscal equity grounds. However, this problem of the fairness of donor burden-sharing
may be regarded as less pressing given that fiscal equity between donor sub-nations as a
whole and recipient sub-nations has been improved. If the revenues raised from such
seemingly costless means are insufficient, they could be supplemented by inter-
jurisdictional transfers that took account of fiscal equity considerations.
Third, another efficiency-improving revenue source that might be collected on a
coordinated basis is capital income taxation in one of its forms. Standard tax
competition principles suggest that sub-national jurisdictions would compete down the
tax rate on capital income relative to the optimal level. (There are considerations that
temper this effect, such as the so-called hold-up problem that leads capital tax rates to
be excessive.) To the extent that this is the case, a coordinated agreement to impose a
national capital tax would yield a ‘free’ source of revenue along the lines of the double
dividend from externality taxes. Similar considerations as to the usefulness of this
source of finance apply.
4 Implications for global revenue sources
There are both parallels and differences between a hypothetical federation of sub-
nations with no national government and the global economy consisting of many
national governments. In both cases, a number of states exercise independent authority
with no oversight from an upper-level government. Some states will be better off than
others in one or more of the following senses: their average incomes are higher, they
have greater endowments of resources, their level of economic and social development
is higher, and the needs for public services and infrastructure are easier to meet. They
exercise their fiscal authority not only to provide public goods that would not otherwise
be provided by the private sector, but more important to promote redistributive equity
through the tax-transfer system and the provision of important public services. And,
since the states interact with one another in a broader economy, there will be various
forms of fiscal spillover and fiscal competition that can lead to inefficiencies in resource
allocation. There will presumably be some consensus by the citizens of better-off states
to redistribute to those of less well-off states, whether out of altruistic motives or as a
matter of ethical conviction. Taken together, the inefficiency of state fiscal interaction
and the consensus to make it possible for citizens in less well-off states to advance22
imply that there is some collective gain to be had from coordinated decisionmaking.
Uncoordinated state decisionmaking will lead to the same sort of inefficiencies and
inequities in the global economy of nations as in the national economy of sub-nations.
Despite these similarities, the differences among nations are likely to be more
pronounced than among sub-nations. Income and development disparities across nations
are likely to be more pronounced. Cultural, linguistic, religious, and ethnic differences
will be greater. Institutional differences will be sharper. National political
decisionmaking will give rise to greater variations in national policy choices than is the
case across sub-nations within a given country.
These differences will be reflected in the international policy imperatives that will arise.
National economies are likely to be more highly integrated than the world economy,
although this distinction is becoming blurred with globalization. Labour is less mobile
internationally, interdependencies in markets for goods and services are less, and the
importance of spillovers crossing national borders might also be less. At the same time,
because of the distinct sovereign nature of nations, certain types of transactions between
them might be much harder to monitor, regulate and tax in an international setting than
within nations. Good examples of this are financial capital and certain types of
e-commerce. Nations are not able to tax these types of transactions at rates as high as
they might prefer. With respect to world equity, it may be the case that the level of
solidarity or social citizenship is less at the global level than the national level, so there
may be more tolerance for fiscal inequity among nations than among sub-nations within
a country.
The conceptual basis for addressing the inefficiencies and inequities in a world of
nations—particularly the manner of raising revenues for international redistributive
purposes—is similar to that in a highly decentralized federation in some fundamental
respects. The sovereignty of nations implies that vertical equity among their citizens is
primarily their responsibility. This is an issue of some importance from the point of
view of considering new sources of global revenue, and the use to which it will be put.
If one accepts the view that vertical equity is best ‘assigned’ to national governments,
the main purpose of state-to-state redistribution is to achieve inter-state fiscal equity at
least to some degree, that is, to reduce the gaps among nations in their ability to provide
comparable public services and transfers at comparable levels of taxation.
This argument that pursuing fiscal equity is the appropriate basis for designing a system
of development assistance is not innocuous. If instead one takes the view that the
objective should be to further some notion of world vertical equity, the nature of
optimal development assistance financing would be different. The criterion for
financing development assistance would be vertical equity among individuals in the
world rather than fiscal equity among nations. Financial instruments would then be
judged and designed according to the incidence on persons of different income groups
regardless of where they reside rather than their incidence on nations according to their
abilities to finance public services. In other words, the ideal would be a system of
progressive inter-personal taxes and transfers—a world income tax system—as opposed
to a system of inter-state equalization transfers. This seems to be the clearest message
that comes out of the fiscal federalism literature: it should be fiscal equity among states
rather than vertical equity among individuals that informs the design of a financing
development financing system.23
This point of view presumes that nations are best placed to assume responsibility for
vertical equity within their jurisdictions. That involves a serious value judgement and is
also subject to some important caveats. For one, donor countries may not accept the
view that recipient countries should be (or can be) responsible for redistributive equity
within their own borders. Donors may be ‘paternalistic’ about national preferences for
redistribution, just like altruistic donors within a country may prefer their charitable
donations or the transfers of their governments to be tied to certain uses by recipients
rather than having no strings attached. Second, even if donor countries are willing to
accept recipient nations’ responsibility for vertical equity, there is still the possibility
that fiscal competition entails inadequate levels of redistribution because of the race-to-
the-bottom. These caveats need not be of primary concern to us to the extent that we
focus on the raising of revenues from donor countries rather than their use by recipients.
What do these principles suggest about suitable sources of new revenues for financing
development? Three separate classes of fiscal revenue sources can be distinguished:
taxes on nations, taxes on global externalities, and taxes on transactions for which
national tax rates have been competed down because of international mobility.3
4.1 Taxes on nations: a global equalization scheme
A system of taxes on the better-off nations to finance new development assistance for
less well-off nations—effectively, a global equalization system—represents a purely
redistributive source of revenue. It is the preferred form of redistributive taxation to the
extent that one accepts the argument that vertical redistribution among households is the
responsibility of nations themselves. An appropriate criterion for determining the
allocation of tax burdens among nations is fiscal equity: a nation’s contribution should
be related to its ability to provide some international standard of public services and
redistributive transfers to its citizens at comparable levels of taxation.4 The principle of
fiscal equity and how it could be made operational by a system of equalizing taxes and
transfers has been discussed above. Here we point out the special problems that arise in
an international setting.
−   Since there is no world government, donor nations must agree cooperatively on the
system of taxes to impose on themselves. This is a serious issue both because
achieving unanimous agreement is difficult when the sharing of burdens is at stake
and because there may be disagreement about the principles that should be used.
One advantage of the fiscal equity criterion is that it is a principle that can be
defended on normative grounds, and that is used in a federal context.
−   Even if fiscal equity is a suitable objective, the global societal consensus may not be
for full fiscal equity, that is, full social citizenship. Agreement must then be reached
on the degree of partial fiscal equity to be pursued.
                                                
3 Other sources of revenue that are less related to our topic are discussed in other project-related
WIDER Discussion Papers, such as a global lottery, SDRs, private donations, and emigrants’
remittances.
4 One could argue that a similar criterion should determine the allocation of development finance
among less well-off nations, but the use of the funds is not our concern.24
−   Consensus may differ among donor countries. It may then be sensible to begin with
agreement among a subset of countries, what is referred to as flexible fiscal
architecture and discussed in Atkinson (2003).
−   Putting fiscal equity into operation is more difficult in a global setting than in a
federal setting. In the latter, sub-national government tax-expenditure policies are
likely to be much less diverse than is the case among nations. That means devising a
representative standard level and mix of public services, transfers and taxes against
which to measure each nation’s capacity is much more difficult internationally than
among sub-nations in a federation.
−   A system of national contributions should take account of contributions that nations
would otherwise be making voluntarily. There are two dimensions to this. First,
fiscal equity would suggest that a nation’s assigned contribution or tax take account
of all voluntary contributions that the nation might make. Second, the possibility of
crowding-out discussed earlier must be addressed. The system could give not only
credit for such transfers but perhaps also an additional incentive, much as national
tax systems give additional incentives for household voluntary contributions. If the
agreement were only among a subset of nations, the additional problem must be
recognized that voluntary contributions of non-participants could be crowded out.
Given these difficulties, especially that of devising a suitable measure of a nation’s
capacity to pay, it may be necessary to fall back on a macro indicator of fiscal equity. It
would have to be one that can be measured on a consistent basis across nations and that
also is a rough index of fiscal equity. The one that comes to mind is the nation’s GDP.
4.2 Taxes on international externalities
To the extent that certain types of activities give rise to externalities that transcend
borders, taxes on these transactions would be potentially efficient sources of financing
for global use. This is fully considered in Sandmo (2003), so there is little need to dwell
on it here. However, some issues can be raised.
−   International agreement is obviously needed here as well in order to establish the
authority to implement such a tax. The tax may be implemented by an international
tax collecting administration, or individual nations could be entrusted with
collecting the tax and turning the proceeds over to an international authority.
−   The global externality tax (or taxes) will at least partly displace national taxes that
are already in place. This implies that some revenues that are currently going to
national governments will be diverted to a world authority. Some account would
have to be taken of this at least for some period of transition. That might be easiest
to do to if nations also have a tax against which credit can be given.
−   There will undoubtedly be design and compliance problems associated with
externalities taxation to the extent that a given type of externality can come from
diverse sources, some of which are difficult to monitor.25
−   A global externality tax system will do little to address the fiscal equity objective, at
least among donor nations. However, it will serve to reduce fiscal inequities
between donor and recipient nations.
−   The problem of crowding-out will apply with respect to revenues generated from
this source as well.
Despite these problems, it is difficult to argue against ‘free’ revenues that can be
obtained from a tax on global externalities. Presumably the same principle would apply
to obtaining revenues from the use of world resources that are not owned by any nation.
Thus, valuable resources from international waters (fish, minerals, etc.) and the use of
the atmosphere or outer space, such as by satellites, might be regarded as legitimate
common property resources of the world community.
4.3 Taxes on internationally mobile taxbases
A third main source of finance for development use might be global taxation of taxbases
that nations are liable to compete away because of international mobility, or that they
underutilize because of monitoring problems. Examples include capital, especially
financial capital, income (Grabel 2003), currency transactions (Nissanke 2003) and the
taxation of internet transactions involving services that are difficult to monitor when
they cross borders. In principle, international agreement should be possible for a
harmonized increase in taxes of these types, given that non-cooperative tax competition
is responsible for their low equilibrium tax rates. However, there are significant
problems with relying on such taxes for financing new development assistance.
−   There is a divergence of interests between net exporting and net importing nations
that will make a cooperative solution difficult.
−   The incidence of these taxes will not bear a close relationship with fiscal equity
considerations, so they may not be regarded as ‘fair’ taxes. In the absence of a need
for development assistance, cooperative agreements on taxing mobile taxbases
would likely lead to the taxes collected being returned to the nation of origin.
−   There will be significant administrative and compliance problems associated with
taxing these transactions unless an international tax administration is instituted with
significant powers of audit and information gathering.
−   Crowding-out of national voluntary contributions will be an issue.
These considerations would also apply to global taxes levied on specific transactions
simply because they are good revenue sources. Narrow-based taxes will either be
distortionary or inequitable, and their incidence among nations would bear little
resemblance to a fair allocation based on fiscal equity.26
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